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Abstract	  
	  
The	   Engage	   programme	   was	   launched	   in	   April	   2006	   by	   the	   Government	  
Communication	  Network	  (GCN)	  in	  the	  UK.	  As	  a	  civil	  service	  body	  supporting	  those	  in	  
government	  working	   as	   press	   officers	   and	   in	  marketing	   roles,	   the	  GCN	  under	   the	  
New	  Labour	  government	  in	  the	  period	  2006–2010	  was	  involved	  with	  the	  extension	  
of	  the	  logic	  of	  marketisation	  to	  government	  communication.	  This	  article	  charts	  this	  
process	   by	   examining	   key	   government	   policy	   documents	   from	   this	   period.	   The	  
rationale	  for	  Engage	  rested	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  government	  in	  the	  UK	  needed	  
to	   adapt	   its	   communication	   approach	   to	   reach	   what	   were	   perceived	   as	  
individualised	  consumers	   in	  society.	  The	  extension	  of	  the	   logic	  of	  marketisation	  to	  
government	  communication	  that	  happened	  under	  Engage	  is	  shown	  to	  be	  consistent	  
with	  the	  New	  Public	  Management	  approach	  to	  public	  services	  under	  New	  Labour.	  
	  
	   Keywords:	   government	   communication;	   New	   Labour;	   Government	  
	   Communication	  Network;	  new	  public	  management;	  marketisation.	  
 2 
The Engage programme and the Government Communication 
Network in the UK, 2006–2010 
 
 
Introduction 
The Engage programme was launched in April 2006 by the Government 
Communication Network (GCN) under the New Labour government (1997–2010). As a 
civil service body in the UK, supporting government press officers and those working in 
marketing, the GCN contributed to the extension of the logic of marketisation to 
government communication. Under the terms of Engage, the ‘public’ were conceived of 
as an ‘audience’, while ‘citizens’ were conceived of as ‘consumers’. This article charts 
this shift by surveying several key government policy documents that helped shape 
Engage and changed the terms of government communication in the period 2006–2010. 
The establishment of the post of ‘Permanent Secretary, Government Communications’ 
under New Labour and the resulting innovations that were put in place, led to a 
breaking down of the traditional dichotomy between news and information, and 
advertising and marketing. The first person to hold the position was Howell James, who 
argued that under the terms of communication government should be considered as a 
company and citizens as consumers. This position was intellectually consistent with the 
idea shown in Engage documentation, that some sort of fundamental societal shift had 
occurred by 2006, rendering traditional government communication approaches 
redundant. The rationale for Engage rests on the assumption that government in the UK 
at this time needed to adapt its approach to communication to reach what were 
perceived as individualised consumers in society. This article locates this in relation to 
the New Public Management (NPM) approach to public services under New Labour, as 
influenced by public choice theory.  
  The article is comprised of desk-based research, employing documentary 
analysis to provide a qualitative analysis of UK government policy documents. It draws 
on archival research techniques, used to retrieve policy documents from online 
databases, and other government information placed online (Atkinson and Coffey, 
2004).  These policy documents (and Internet sources) come both from the direct period 
of analysis (2006–2010) and from the wider period of 1997–2011, in order to highlight 
the policy context under New Labour before the Engage programme was launched, and 
in the period that immediately followed the cessation of the New Labour government. 
The documents analysed include ten from the Cabinet Office (the ministerial 
department that coordinates the work of government in the UK), one from the Central 
Office of Information, and five that emanated directly from central government. Two 
speeches from a senior civil servant (Howell James) are considered alongside material 
from two UK Parliamentary select committees: the House of Lords Select Committee 
on Communications and the House of Commons Select Committee on Public 
Administration. The documentary analysis approach that is employed in this article was 
guided by the following points, to ensure that the following was considered: 1) the 
information that the given document provides on the Engage programme, and its 
position within the overall framework for government communication during this 
period; 2) the information that the given document provides on Engage in relation to the 
extension of the logic of marketisation to government communication, where changes 
have taken place as compared to former structures; 3) the information that the given 
document provides on how Engage was connected to the wider political principles 
underpinning New Labour, both as a government and as a political project.  
 
 3 
New Labour and Government Communication 
The charge that New Labour had ushered a new era of ʻspinʼ in government 
communication into British political life, that superseded anything that had gone before, 
was heard from many quarters. It can be suggested that New Labour became 
synonymous with spin, and the party experienced a substantial breakdown in trust 
regarding its communication style (see Cabinet Office, 2004). Numerous studies have 
addressed the extent to which spin was practiced by New Labour in its government 
communication and have attempted to provide a theorisation of the practice (Andrews, 
2006; Franklin, 2004a, 2004b; Gaber, 2000a, 2000b; McNair, 2000, 2004). Given the 
extent of the problem, other scholars have discussed the regulation of government 
communication and the extent to which spin might be limited (Daintith, 2001; Yeung, 
2006). Various events relating to communication during the New Labour years resulted 
in inquiries and government reviews, such as the report of the House of Commons 
Public Administration Select Committee report (2002) that followed the furore over 
actions at the Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions. There a 
special advisor sent an email on 11 September 2001, ‘urging the release of “anything we 
want to bury” in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the USA’ (House of Commons 
Public Administration Select Committee, 2002: 5). That report called for ‘a sustainable 
improvement in the quality of the service provided by the permanent civil servants in 
the Government Information and Communication Service’ (Cabinet Office, 2004: 1).  
The recommendation of the Public Administration Select Committee led to the 
Phillis Review, and the resulting report has a substantial bearing on the content of this 
article. Gaber (2004: 366) argues that as two reports were published – an interim and 
final report – the impact of the review was muted: ‘Its significance has been confused in 
the public discussion because, amid the protracted resignation process, two reports from 
an independent inquiry into government communications were published’, with the first 
being published four days after Alastair Campbell’s resignation, and the second being 
published four days before the Hutton Inquiry reported. Returning to the ramifications 
of Phillis in media and communication research in the UK is of central importance; it 
remains a critical starting point for judging later government policy, such as the Engage 
programme. In his report, Phillis found that there had been ‘A three way breakdown in 
trust between politicians, media and the public’, and that there should ‘be a sustained 
commitment to a long-term programme of radical change in the conduct, process and 
style of government communications’ (Cabinet Office, 2004: 2). Phillis also found that 
the ‘credibility’ of government communications needed to be restored following various 
events regarding government communication since 1997. The principles the report sets 
out encourage a move towards greater openness and transparency in government 
communication, and a move towards greater unmediated communication between 
politicians and the public. Specifically, the Phillis review found that the Civil Service 
communication model was outdated, and that the Civil Service had ‘not grasped the 
potential of modern communications as a service provided for citizens’ (Cabinet Office, 
2004: 3). Phillis argued that the then incumbent Government Information 
Communication Service (GICS) was not fit for purpose, and recommended its 
dissolution. The new communications service that was set up was the aforementioned 
GCN, that replaced the GICS in late 2004. 
 
The Post-Phillis environment in Government Communication 
Of the twelve recommendations that Phillis made, two points are of particular 
importance to this analysis. First, on the Civil Service communication structure, Phillis 
recommended the installation of a new ‘Permanent Secretary, Government 
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Communications’, to provide improved structure, and greater accountability (Cabinet 
Office, 2004: 2). As ‘Head of Profession’ he or she would have a remit to ‘provide 
strategic leadership for communications across government’ (Cabinet Office, 2004: 2). 
Part of the rationale behind the establishment of the role of Permanent Secretary, 
Government Communications, was that the occupier of the role might become an 
assessor and appraiser of government communication, while also being in charge of it. 
Phillis suggested that this would be one way of ensuring ‘consistency and high 
standards across government’, and that the Permanent Secretary would ‘provide the 
framework against which departments assess their communications performance’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2004: 14). Howell James was the first incumbent of the position, and 
was later replaced by Matt Tee in November 2008 (HM Government, 2008). The 
Permanent Secretary position was located within the Cabinet Office, directly 
responsible to Sir Gus O’Donnell, the then Cabinet Secretary and head of the Civil 
Service (this post has subsequently been divided between different role holders).  
 One of the key shifts that occurred in the post-Phillis environment of government 
communication was the merging of government communication relating to news and 
information with what could be termed advertising and marketing. Under the pre-Phillis 
arrangements there was a wider gap between the work of the Government Information 
Service (GIS), that became the GICS, and the work of the Central Office for 
Information (COI), which was termed the ‘Government’s centre of excellence for 
marketing and communications’ (COI, 2010). In the case of the GIS and the GICS, the 
emphasis was on news and information, while the COI had an emphasis on direct 
advertising. This was despite the fact that Alastair Campbell (the Director of 
Communications and Strategy under Tony Blair) had held formal control over both 
since 2002 (Weir, 2002). Under the Phillis arrangements – namely the instituting of the 
post of Permanent Secretary, Government Communications – the dichotomy between 
these two areas became less clear. Indeed, the first incumbent of the new post Howell 
James (2005a) stated that ‘unlike the GICS, [the GCN] … will support and connect all 
government communicators – from those working in internal, stakeholder and e-
communication to those that are marketing specialists and press officers’. This shift is 
crucial to the terms of analysis of this article, whereby government communication 
pertaining to news management and political communication to journalists became 
increasingly merged with a more marketised model of communication relating to direct 
communications to citizens, whereby some functions of government communication are 
moved into the private sector, while the main shift is through the extension of market 
logic to government communication. The post of Permanent Secretary, Government 
Communications formalised the connections between these two areas, in a way that had 
not previously been the case. The closing down of the COI was later recommended by 
Matt Tee (Cabinet Office, 2011), with the decision being implemented in 2012. 
 
Government Communication: ‘akin to the role of marketing in a successful 
company’ 
To begin to understand the extent to which the principles of marketing were brought 
into government communication under New Labour, we can turn to two speeches from 
Howell James (the first holder of the Permanent Secretary, Government 
Communications post). In What future for Government Communications? James 
(2005a) noted that he understood his role as making ‘the voice of the public heard at the 
policy table so that government develops and delivers services which reflect customer 
expectations and desires’. In a separate speech given the same year, Lemons into 
Peaches (1), James set out his perspective that the basic work of government 
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communication was managing the flow of news (James, 2005b). He outlined the threat 
of a breakdown in trust between government and the public, where there is a ‘perceived 
asymmetry of information between government and public’ (James, 2005b). However, 
he argued most prominently in the speech that government communication should be 
located firmly within a business paradigm, with citizens being primarily viewed as 
consumers. James argued that communication in government is ‘akin to the role of 
marketing in a successful company. Whenever I say that in front of audiences like this, I 
see sceptical eyebrows being raised. But I believe it’s true’ (James, 2005b). His 
argument followed from the view that in successful companies marketers listen to the 
needs and wants of the customers, and begin to reflect this in their products, ‘so that the 
fit between product and need becomes ever closer and most satisfying’ (James, 2005b).  
 Reverting to the first mentioned speech, government communication for James 
should learn directly from private sector approaches: ‘I want to see government 
communicators able to learn from the best and most customer driven approaches in the 
private sector and adapt these disciplines to the unique circumstances of government’ 
(James, 2005a). As government communication begins to replicate good business 
practice, and operate accordingly, the public become the ‘market’ and the government 
the ‘marketers’. This argument is crystallised in this passage from Lemons into Peaches: 
 
 Effective government communication means rebuilding chunks of the machinery 
of government around the disciplines of marketing … That means getting close 
to the public. Indeed it means bringing the public into government. It’s about 
developing acutely-sensitive antennae, about listening hard, about sharing 
information, about involving the public in policy-development, and continuously 
and explicitly refining policy and policy-delivery in response to their concerns. 
(James, 2005b) 
 
In James’s understanding, government communication is most effective when based 
around marketing principles, where the view of the customer is of primary importance. 
This is a movement away from communication models where the citizen requires 
information from government, which leads to the formation of public opinion and 
ultimately impacts on the voting process (Habermas, 2009). While in this passage James 
allows for the ‘bringing the public into government’, it is done so under the logic of 
market principles, rather than the principles of citizenship. 
 
The Engage programme 
In April 2006 the GCN established the Engage programme, as ‘a strategic framework 
for government communication’ (Cabinet Office, 2006a). Howell James stated that this 
would ‘address the issue in Phillis about those various behaviours between departments’ 
to bring about ‘a more professional communications function across the piece’ (House 
of Lords Select Committee on Communications, 2009: 17–18). The government 
suggested that Engage was ‘about putting the public at the heart of government 
communications in line with the Phillis report’ (HM Government, 2009), while the 
Cabinet Office (2006b) specifically noted ‘the Engage programme came into being, to 
help government communicators understand the implications of changing audience 
behaviour’. The government stated that Engage takes ‘well tried principles of strategic 
communication and adapts them for government’ (HM Government, 2007). During the 
period of analysis, Engage was governed by eight principles, that included ‘listening … 
to people’s motivations, needs and barriers’ and ‘Reaching people in complex 
communications environments’ (Cabinet Office, 2006c). In practical terms, Engage was 
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resourced in government with: 
  
 a knowledge bank, providing you with a practical set of principles, tools, case 
studies and training materials to create engaging communication; a programme of 
events, training and development courses to help you put these materials into 
action; a leadership and engagement programme, providing a context where 
government communications can adapt and develop to put the public at the heart 
of policy. (Cabinet Office, 2006a) 
 
While this article only considers Engage policy materials up until 2010 (the end point of 
the New Labour government), the programme did survive beyond this point for just 
under three years. Engage was later replaced by the Government Communication 
Professional Competency Framework, a framework grouped around four themes: 
insight, ideas, implementation, impact (GCN, 2013a: 3), with these remaining similar to 
the Engage principles.  What was confirmed, however, was the extent to which 
integration between professional roles in government communication was present, with 
the GCN stating: ‘if you work in a press office, we expect you to get better at digital.  If 
you work in digital, we expect you to become better at developing and running 
integrated campaigns’ (GCN, 2013b). 
 
From ‘Public’ to ‘Audience’, from ‘Citizen’ to ‘Customer’ 
The presence of the term ‘audience’ rather than ‘public’ is fairly consistent throughout 
Engage policy documentation, although not ubiquitous (Cabinet Office, 2005, 2006b, 
2007). The term has a central place in one of the main Cabinet Office descriptions of 
Engage: ‘Engage is a way of making government communications more effective by 
putting our audiences first. At its heart is a simple truth: great communication starts 
with an open mind and a listening ear’ (Cabinet Office, 2006a). While this study does 
not employ a formal discourse analysis approach, the use of terminology is important 
here with respect to what it suggests about policy, and the wider ideological approach of 
the GCN. Engage recommended that government communicators increasingly consider 
ways in which to tailor their communication to the needs and desires of the audience, 
conceiving of government as a company trying to sell ideas, in a manner consistent with 
the Howell James approach discussed above. This is government communication 
informed from the bottom up, rather than the top down, with government reacting to the 
whims of the audience in the way that, for example, a commercial television company is 
by necessity required to respond to the whim of the market. In a separate source, the 
government suggested: 
 
 The drive behind the Engage programme is to focus on the needs of citizens in 
order to deliver policies and services that meet them more fully. Innovative tools 
such as insight generation and journey mapping are now being used widely to 
inform policy development and improve the total citizen experience. (Cabinet 
Office, 2009: 125) 
 
Notice that in this passage the term ‘citizen’ remains, and is not literally replaced by 
‘customer’. However, theoretically, the approach here replicates the approach shown in 
various aspects of marketing theory. For example, the inclusion of the terms ‘insight 
generation’ and ‘journey mapping’ provide clear illustration for the point that 
government is embedding marketing principles into its communication policies. On 
insight generation, the European Society for Opinion and Market Research (ESOMAR) 
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suggests that it is ‘a multi-facetted concept, crucial throughout any innovation cycle. 
Generating insights is a constant stream of learning, interpreting, applying and then 
going back to learning’ (ESOMAR, 2010). The rationale for utilising insight generation 
is based on an inherent understanding that communication should be constantly 
informed and re-informed by the receivers of the communication, in this case the public. 
 On customer journey mapping (CJM), we can turn the government’s own 
definition of the term, contained within Customer Journey Mapping: An Introduction, 
(written by Oxford Strategic Marketing) (Cabinet Office, 2010). As the title suggests, 
the term citizen is dropped in favour of ‘customer’ in this case. The document states: 
‘Across government there’s a growing emphasis on getting closer to customers, in order 
to design and deliver services that meet the needs of people and businesses rather than 
the needs of government’ (Cabinet Office, 2010). In specifically defining the term CJM, 
it states that it is ‘the process of tracking and describing all the experiences that 
customers have as they encounter a service … taking into account not only what 
happens to them, but also their responses to their experiences’ (Cabinet Office, 2010). 
There is also an emphasis placed on cutting back spending on public services, through 
references to efficiency saving. It states: ‘Journey mapping can deliver a better customer 
experience and bring about greater efficiencies.  More satisfied customers are cheaper to 
serve and easier to deal with’ (Cabinet Office, 2010). It is suggested that CJM helps to 
identify the ‘cheapest “cost to serve”’ (Cabinet Office, 2010); in other words, this is 
about driving down the cost of communicating to each ‘customer’. This shift, 
encompassing the greater marketisation of government communication, is consistent 
with the NPM approach to public services that will be discussed in more detail below. 
A fundamental shift in the communications environment? 
The documentation attached to the Engage programme suggests that some sort of 
fundamental societal shift had occurred by this point, thus rendering traditional 
communication approaches redundant. For example, the policy Making Government 
work better by...Putting our audiences first (Cabinet Office, 2007) is illuminating as the 
material relates more so to the kind of government communication that had hitherto 
been the domain of government advertising, and thus under the remit of the COI and not 
the GCN (or its predecessors, the GIS or the GICS). The central premise of the 
document is that government is just one voice among many, vying for the public’s 
attention: ‘This explosion of new channels, new media and new ways of communicating 
demands fresh approaches and tools, and this is what the Engage programme provides’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2007: 42). For the Cabinet Office, marketing techniques should be 
imported into government communication, in a manner more akin to the COI (as 
suggested above). Part of this involves ‘gaining deep insights into what motivates 
people. By basing your communication on genuine insight into your audience, real 
behaviour change can happen’ (Cabinet Office, 2007: 42). The extent to which the GCN 
were adopting both the language and the practices of marketing is clear. This is shown 
in the types of organisations that lined up to endorse Engage and its practices, including 
The Chartered Institute of Marketing, the Chartered Institute of Public Relations and the 
National Social Marketing Centre (Cabinet Office, 2007: 43).  
 The view that a fundamental societal shift had taken place is also seen clearly in 
the Cabinet Office document, The communication challenge:  
 
 Big changes in our society, and to the media that serves it, are presenting new 
challenges to those of us who are tasked to communicate in Government. How 
do we ensure our messages cut through the clutter to reach increasingly cynical 
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or indifferent audiences? Clearly, some of our traditional tools aren't working 
any more. And new situations are demanding new tools. (Cabinet Office, 2009: 
125) 
 
Indeed, there have been paradigm shifting changes in the media landscape in the past 
decade or so, including the introduction of Facebook in 2004, Youtube in 2005 and 
Twitter in 2006. However, the solution that is offered under Engage is what most 
particularly needs interrogated. To find a solution to the research question posed in the 
quotation above (‘How do we ensure our messages…?’), the Cabinet Office turned to 
the private sector, publishing Talking to Me? Connecting with Citizens in the Changing 
Media Landscape (Cabinet Office, 2005) (2). In the foreword Howell James sets out the 
‘new mission’ for government communication, as being: 
 
to help Government understand and respond to what people want and need and to 
help people find what they want and need from Government. This will enable us 
to deliver expert, effective communication and help to ensure the voice of 
Government is heard. (Cabinet Office, 2005: 3) 
 
The report clearly argues that government communication must adapt its 
communication to reach the more privatised, individualised citizen in society, and have 
its agenda set by societal trends. One table in the report shows societal ‘trends’ and 
‘counter-trends’, which it is argued ‘is not contradictory; it is generally a result of the 
fragmentation of society. In identifying implications, therefore, care has to be taken to 
avoid a “one size fits all” approach’ (Cabinet Office, 2005: 6). Here society is 
understood as being in flux, with former paradigms of communication being 
undermined by changes in the age profile and affluence of society. 
 To return to the previously discussed Engage document (Cabinet Office, 2006b), 
we learn under the heading The communication landscape that the rationale for the 
Cabinet Office adopting such a marketised approach in the first instance stems from the 
Phillis Review: ‘It called for, “genuine engagement with the public as part of policy 
formation and delivery”. But how do we do this?’ (Cabinet Office, 2006b). While this 
was indeed one of the findings of Phillis, to move from a review that was instigated in 
the wake of the indiscretion on the part of a Special Advisor over a news and 
information matter, to the implementation of a full-scale marketised approach across all 
government communication is to take a large leap. The communication landscape 
document states that the Cabinet Office had ‘taken advice from top flight 
communications practitioners in Government and the private sector and adapted the best 
of their thinking for Government’ (Cabinet Office, 2006b), but this is seemingly not 
what Phillis recommended (3). As stated at the beginning of this section on Engage, the 
key shift that appears to occur in the post-Phillis environment is the merging of 
government communication relating to news and information, with what could be 
termed government marketing with regards to direct communications. Phillis was most 
concerned with the restoration of trust in government communication, rather than the 
establishment of marketing principles. It seems that, in this case, the events leading up 
to Phillis had been used to usher in principles that were somewhat unrelated, using a 
crisis in government communication structures to bring about a fundamental change to 
government communication philosophy. 
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Locating Engage: New Public Management, Public Choice Theory and the 
extension of the logic of marketisation to government communication  
This article has to this point addressed the communications structures under the GCN 
and policies encompassed by the Engage programme. In this next section it will seek to 
locate the programme in relation to New Labour’s wider approach to public 
administration, under the influence of NPM. In so doing it will be argued that the 
Engage programme is consistent with the overall New Labour project, and reflects the 
influence that New Labour had during its time in office over the ‘non-political’ Civil 
Service. New Labour substantially adopted the NPM approach to the reform of public 
services, which can be said to be inclusive of: 
 
various forms of decentralizing management within public services (e.g., the 
creation of autonomous agencies and devolution of budgets and financial control), 
increasing use of markets and competition in the provision of public services (e.g., 
contracting out and other market-type mechanisms), and increasing emphasis on 
performance, outputs and customer orientation. (Larbi, 1999: iv) 
 
The late Stuart hall, trenchant critic of New Labour, termed NPM ‘the marketisation of 
the state’s governing and administrative practices, the transformation of public service 
individuals into “entrepreneurial subjects” and the adaptation of the machinery of state 
to the “mission” of “entrepreneurial governance”’ (Hall, 2003: 16).  For Hall (2003: 
16), NPM was the path by which ‘neo-liberal ideas actually inform institutional 
practices’. In terms of government communication for New Labour, this translated to 
the dictum:  ‘More satisfied customers are cheaper to serve and easier to deal with’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2010). But this approach is not alone driven by having easier 
customers (citizens) to deal with, so that public administration will become more 
efficient; customer service is rather intrinsic to governance under this model, where 
‘public organisations have no intrinsic rationale but act under a rationality assumption 
deriving from the value they create for society’ (Lane, 2005: 7).  
 An underpinning concept of NPM is public choice theory (Denhardt, 2011; Lane, 
2005), and it was also influential in the development of New Labour’s approach to 
public administration. Summarising the work of Ostrom, Denhardt (2011: 138) notes 
that in public choice theory there is a ‘methodological individualism, or the presumption 
that the individual-that is, a representative individual decision maker-is the basic unit of 
analysis … self-interested, rational, and seeking to maximize his or her own utilities’. In 
the case of New Labour, the consumer of public services became central, as the figure 
who ‘stands at the heart of New Labour's approach to the reform and modernisation of 
public services’ (Vidler and Clarke, 2005: 19). Marquand (2004) argues that by 
adopting public choice theory into the delivery of public services, not all public services 
necessarily need to be privatized, concurring with Hall (2012: 18), ‘New Labour finally 
understood that there was no need for the political hassle to privatise. You could simply 
burrow underneath the distinction between state and market’. This can be seen to be 
encapsulated by the Blairite government minister Alan Milburn, who compared the 
requirements of public services today with the principles of the 1940s: ‘Today we live 
in a quite different world. We live in a consumer age. People demand services tailor 
made to their individual needs’ (Milburn, 2002, cited in Vidler and Clarke, 2005: 20–
21). Finlayson’s (2009) analysis of schemes such as the Child Trust Fund, that involved 
individual parents being given responsibility for investing the government payment that 
they received at the birth of a child, shows how these ideas became actualised in policy. 
Rather than the ‘man-from-the-ministry-knows-best approach to public services’ (as 
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described by the former Prime Minister Gordon Brown) (Brown, 2010), New Labour 
entrusted the payment to individuals on the basis that they knew best. New Labour 
implemented this approach extensively in its approach to healthcare, education (and 
other sectors), using the consumer as an ‘organizing principle’ (Vidler and Clarke, 
2005: 20). Indeed, for Hall (2003: 16) the adoption of a public choice approach was for 
New Labour ‘the main source of the drive to re-constitute citizens as consumers’.  
The central principles of the Engage programme can be clearly understood 
within the terms of NPM, especially with regards to government directing its 
communication to the customer, as a consumer-receiver of government communication, 
rather than as a citizen-receiver. By re-constituting citizens as consumers (cf. Hall, 
2003: 16) through its communication, New Labour could imagine the individual in 
communication terms in a similar way that it had done so in terms of the wider 
economy and society. The wider public policy agenda of the government became 
influential on New Labour’s reform of the civil service structures. As New Labour 
moved increasingly further from its democratic socialist roots towards a Thatcherite 
model of governance, the ‘customer as individual’ increasingly became the way that 
citizens were thought of. As the ‘new mission for government communication’ 
(returning to James’s understanding) becomes one that helps ‘Government understand 
and respond to what people want and need and to help people find what they want and 
need from Government’ (Cabinet Office, 2005: 3), government becomes increasingly 
unable to speak to wider social, economic and political issues that affect society as a 
whole, not just the individual. Under the terms of Engage, NPM is thoroughly worked 
through across the communication apparatuses of government. Counter claims, arguing 
for a type of government communication that speaks to wider society, have no place 
under this approach; in Alan Milburn’s words, ‘We live in a consumer age’ (Milburn, 
2002, cited in Vidler and Clarke, 2005: 20–21), and thus the place of the citizen in 
society and their communicative relationship with government is increasingly replaced 
by that of the consumer.  
 
Conclusions 
In assessing the extent to which these wider political developments had a bearing on 
government communication, a number of concluding points can be made in light of the 
case study on the Engage programme. First, the extension of the logic of the market to 
government communication can be said to have taken place, to the extent that while 
most government communication was not literally moved into the private sector, private 
sector principles were appropriated from marketing theory and brought into the centre 
of government communication. Staying within Hall’s terms mentioned above, in so 
doing ‘the distinction between state and market’ (Hall, 2012: 18) is undermined. In this 
sense, extending the logic of the market to government communication under New 
Labour first entails government changing the approach it takes to its communication, 
rethinking the way in which it conceives of its target audience. Here, government 
communication remains within the civil service (the public sector), but it is planned and 
implemented as though it was in the private sector. Despite this, the latter move to shut 
down the COI in 2011, recommended by Matt Tee, the second incumbent of the 
Permanent Secretary, Government Communications post (Cabinet Office, 2011), was a 
more literal move towards a privatised model for government advertising services, 
allowing the logic of marketisation to follow its course. Government advertising was 
taken out of the civil service, and instead replaced with a system that functions to tender 
advertising work to private sector advertising agencies. Comments from the 
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Conservative Cabinet Office minister Francis Maude on the decision are again 
consistent with the NPM approach, showing continuity from New Labour to the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrats coalition government: ‘communications spending in 
the future will never again get out of hand and instead will be more transparent, better 
co-ordinated and less bureaucratic’ (BBC News, 2011). It must be asked: where are the 
limits to the extension of market logic in relation to government communication, and 
indeed, full privatisation? If government is willing to move advertising into the private 
sector, why not also privatise news management, and have professional public relations 
agencies handle the news-advertising accounts? 
 Second, government communication has also become increasingly treated like 
other areas of government expenditure, as akin to the funding of hospitals or roads, 
which is further evidence of the influence of NPM on government communication. It 
can be noted that in 1997 the Cabinet Office (1997: 28) had in place a principle that 
suggested that government communication ‘should be conducted in an economic and 
appropriate way, having regard to the need to be able to justify the costs as expenditure 
of public funds’, long before Engage was implemented. It follows therefore that 
government communication to its citizens (or customers) can be cut back as financial 
pressures necessitate: if you cannot afford to communicate to citizens, cut back the 
budget. Matt Tee’s Review of government direct communication and the role of COI 
(Cabinet Office, 2011) argues this point precisely, where Tee links the need to reduce 
government spending on communication with the UK government’s priority (post-
2010) to reduce the fiscal deficit. Under a heading ‘A smaller role for government’ he 
argues: 
 
It is … envisaged that there will be fewer but more effective communications, 
with a greater role being passed to communities and to partners, both civic and 
commercial. This means that paid-for communications will not be the only 
solution to government marketing problems. There may be others who are better 
placed to achieve its goals. (Cabinet Office, 2011: 30) 
 
This is a precise call for outsourcing the work of government communication, both to 
the market and to other partners in civil society (who are not described). Thus he asks, 
‘are there commercial, voluntary or civic sector partners with whom government could 
work? Such partners may often have a closer relationship with the target audience 
through existing channels’ (Cabinet Office, 2011: 31). In Tee’s understanding, 
government need not claim that it knows best on how it should communicate. This loss 
of confidence in government’s ability to communicate to its citizenry sits squarely 
within the logic of the NPM approach. 
 Third, the way government communication was staffed with the establishment of 
the GCN and the Engage programme became consistent with the wider NPM approach, 
where ‘The New Public Management “empowers” civil servants to abandon the 
principles of political impartiality and, like private-sector CEOs, “take ownership” of 
their sectors, in a more “agency-driven” style’ (Hall, 2003: 17). This can be further 
explored in light of Marquand’s (2004) Decline of the Public thesis, which 
comprehensively overviews the systemic destruction of this public domain under the 
marketisation and privatisation of public services, and the spread of the doctrine of 
neoliberalism. Marquand’s (2004: 1) definition of public domain is that space which is 
‘the domain of citizenship, equity and service whose integrity is essential to democratic 
governance and social well-being’, linked to the notion of the public interest, while its 
institutions ‘are the sources of public trust’ (Marquand, 2004: 33). In line with the 
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extension of neoliberal principles to the public sector, Marquand argues that the Senior 
Civil Service in the UK also became transformed, a domain ‘where the frontiers of the 
public domain had been most zealously guarded, and in which its values had been most 
thoroughly internalized’ (Marquand, 2004: 2). We see this clearly in the approach of 
Howell James discussed above, whose approach was perhaps indistinguishable from 
that of one in charge of communications at a private sector firm. This is directly in line 
with Hall’s idea that New Labour didn’t need the political hassle of full privatisation 
(Hall, 2012: 18); many parts of the civil service that could not be directly privatised 
were rather handed to next-step agencies, whose ‘managers were supposed to operate as 
though they were running private firms’ (Marquand, 2004: 109). Here, the logic of 
marketisation stands in for full privatisation. For Marquand (2004: 109), the ‘rump’ that 
was left over would be subjected to ‘subtler methods’ that ‘could – and did – transform 
its mentality’. In the case of the Engage programme, we can understand the extension of 
the logic of the market to government communication, in these terms: the public domain 
that previously incorporated government communication is increasingly dissolved, 
allowing government communication to be privatised in some areas in a literal sense, 
and in other areas is hollowed out by the undermining of the concept of the public 
domain. 
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Notes 
 
1. James uses the ‘lemons into peaches’ analogy from economic theory, where lemons are 
considered dud products, and peaches are considered good products. The seller knows the 
difference, but the buyer does not. As a result there is a breakdown in trust, and the value of 
both the lemons and the peaches diminish. In this speech James argues that there is a lesson in 
this for government communication. 
 
2. Talking to Me? was published by the Cabinet Office in conjunction with private sector 
consultants Henley Centre/HeadLightVision (part of WPP, the global advertising group) and 
Media Edge (specialists in market engagement). 
 
3. Phillis mentions the ‘customer’ in this sense on six occasions, suggesting that online 
communication be ‘customer-driven’ (Cabinet Office, 2004: 26) and suggests that an improved 
regional communications service be ‘customer focused and responsive to the public’s needs’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2004: 19). In an appendix to the report, early thinking from the review group 
behind the recommendations did suggest ‘It is important to recognise the role of the general 
public as customers’ (Cabinet Office, 2004: 33). However, the resulting ‘test’ seeks to engender 
better engagement with the ‘public’. It is an emphasis on the public rather than on the customer 
that is much more in keeping with the overall tenor of the Phillis recommendations when taken 
as a whole. 
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